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Abstract 
Combat is the most intense form of military service, but several aspects 
of the training experience, which explicitly prepares people for violent 
warfare, are hypothesized to link service to violent crime. Using 
Australia’s Vietnam-era conscription lotteries for identification and 
criminal court data from Australia’s three largest states, we seek to 
estimate the effect of army training on violent crime. Using various 
specifications, we find no evidence that military training causes violent 
crime, and our point estimates are always negative. In our preferred 
specification (using only non-deployed cohorts), we rule out with 95% 
confidence any positive violent crime effects larger than 3.6% relative to 
the mean. 
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, economists have contributed to an interdisciplinary consensus on the central role 
of early life experiences in determining life outcomes (Knudsen et al. 2006).1 While other 
disciplines have studied the importance of early childhood for many decades, the recent 
contributions of economists can be distinguished by their application of quasi-experimental 
identification strategies. This growing evidence base has been accompanied by calls for public 
policies to focus increasingly on early childhood interventions. 
Nevertheless, people still may be malleable, or vulnerable to significant life events, in early 
adulthood. Yet the extent to which intense psychological experiences shape young adults’ lives 
has rarely been studied by economists. One appealing context in which to address this void is 
military service, which is undertaken globally by a significant fraction of young males. A number 
of studies have explored the effect of military service on wages and employment.2 Their results 
must be interpreted in light of numerous potential mechanisms involved, including how valued 
military service is in civilian labor markets (Angrist 1990), what impact veterans’ programs have 
on human capital (Angrist 1993; Bound and Turner 2002), and what direct and incentive effects 
veterans’ disability compensation has on those who served (Autor et al. 2011; Siminski 
forthcoming). An additional complication for studying conscripts (who did not choose military 
service) is that any negative economic effects may reflect their comparative advantage in the 
civilian labor market (Keane 2010; Oi 1967). 
Thus, for a variety of reasons, effects on earnings and employment do not speak directly to our 
primary interest: whether the military experience is harmful for psychological or social 
                                                 
1 A number of studies have found large effects of in utero shocks to maternal nutrition, disease 
and pollution on adult health outcomes, educational attainment and wages (Almond and Currie 
2011a). Children’s characteristics, measured at an early age (5 or 7 years) explain a large fraction 
of variation in adult economic outcomes (Almond and Currie 2011b). Recently, Currie and Tekin 
(2012) showed that maltreatment in childhood greatly increases victims’ probability of 
subsequently perpetrating crime. 
2 Examples include studies for the United States (Angrist 1990; Angrist and Krueger 1994; 
Angrist 1998; Angrist et al. 2011; Angrist and Chen 2011), the Netherlands (Imbens and van der 
Klaauw 1995), Germany (Bauer et al. 2012; A. Paloyo 2010), Britain (Grenet et al. 2011), 
Portugal (Card and Cardoso 2012) and Australia (Siminski and Ville 2012; Siminski 
forthcoming).  
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functioning. Previous studies using direct measures of mental health have suffered from 
limitations in statistical power (Dobkin and Shabani 2009), and because of the complications 
inherent in interpreting clinically diagnosed and self-reported health outcomes for veterans 
(Siminski and Ville 2012). An alternate approach is to study behaviors that may be indicative of 
such problems. To that end, several papers have studied mortality, focusing especially on 
external causes, such as suicide and motor vehicle accidents (Angrist et al. 1996; Conley and 
Heerwig 2012; Hearst et al. 1986; Siminski and Ville 2011). Overall, they do not find strong 
evidence of elevated mortality; however, death is a rare and extreme event among the relatively 
young populations included in these studies. 
The perpetration of violent crime is another relevant outcome, one far more common than 
death, among young males. Military service has been hypothesized to increase tendencies for 
violence through several mechanisms, including removal from familiar social environments, 
indoctrination into masculine military culture, familiarization with weapons, the experience of 
extreme stress, and exposure to and participation in violent combat. Three recent studies have 
investigated the effects of military service on crime, each adopting credible identification 
strategies (Galiani et al. 2011; Lindo and Stoecker forthcoming; Rohlfs 2010). These studies 
appear to present a consensus, because each finds some evidence of positive effects of military 
service on crime perpetration.  
However, we argue that the effect of military training on violence remains an open question. 
Rohlfs (2010) explicitly focused on combat intensity. Combat might also be the mechanism 
driving Lindo & Stoeker’s (forthcoming) results.3 Combat is certainly a more intense experience 
than military training, and thus one may expect to find greater effects of combat exposure on 
outcomes such as mental health and violence. Nevertheless, as we will discuss later in detail, 
several of the hypothesized mechanisms linking military service to violent crime relate 
specifically to the training experience. Further, combat events are relatively rare, even among 
military personnel, let alone among civilians. It is difficult to find good data on the numbers of 
service people exposed to combat, but they are likely dwarfed by the numbers who receive 
                                                 
3 Exploiting between-cohort variation, Rohlfs (2010) finds an effect of combat intensity on 
violence among Vietnam veterans. Using conscription lottery IV identification, Lindo & Stoeker 
(forthcoming) find an effect of Vietnam-era service (which for some included combat) on 
violent crime. While the estimates from both studies are imprecise, taken together they suggest 
combat exposure may lead to violent crime perpetration. Clearly such a link is of major policy 
relevance. 
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military training.4 Finally, training is probably a more homogeneous treatment to study than 
deployment or actual combat. 
Only one previous paper has used a quasi-experimental methodology to study the effects of non-
deployed military service on crime: Galiani et al. (2011) studied the case of Argentina, using 
conscription lottery identification.5 They find evidence of significant, but small effects on overall 
crime, but their estimates for violent crime are not statistically significant. Instead, they find 
significant effects on property crimes, which they argue may reflect the reduced economic 
opportunities faced by conscripts. These results highlight the importance of providing veterans 
with adequate training and support for re-engagement with civilian labor markets. Nevertheless, 
a link between army training and violence has not been established. 
We contribute to this evidence base, using the exogenous variation provided by Australia’s 
Vietnam-era conscription lotteries. Between 1965 and 1972, 15 biannual birth cohorts were 
subjected to conscription lotteries, conducted by date of birth, although no one from the last 
three of these cohorts was deployed (Ville and Siminski 2011).6 We draw on a near universe of 
criminal cases with male defendants of relevant age heard in a 17-year period (1994-2010) in 
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC) and Queensland (QLD), representing nearly 500,000 
alleged criminal offenses.7 These three states constitute over three quarters of the Australian 
population. Using three alternate specifications, we consistently find no evidence that army 
training causes violent crime, and our point estimates are always negative. In our preferred 
specification (using only non-deployed cohorts), we can rule out with 95% confidence any 
positive crime effects larger than 3.6% relative to the mean rate. 
                                                 
4 In 2012, there were approximately 20.3 million individuals globally serving in permanent 
military forces, another 44.9 million reservists, and 7.9 million paramilitary personnel 
(International Institute for Strategic Studies 2012). However, deployment is not a good proxy for 
combat exposure. By comparison, there were 0.6 million service-people deployed outside of their 
national borders in November 2011 (over half of whom were from the US). In the Vietnam War 
era, less than 1 in 3 Australian conscripts were deployed, while 5% of those who did serve in 
Vietnam were wounded (Wilson et al. 2005). 
5 See also Paloyo et al. (2010) for an analysis of the effect of military bases on local crime rates. 
6 A 16th birth cohort also was subjected to a National Service lottery in September 1972. 
However, the conscription system was abolished before they were due to be called up. Thus we 
ignore the 16th cohort. 
7 Earlier data are not available. 
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We also aim to make clear the nature of the ‘treatment’ - i.e., to document the nature of 
Australian army training in this era, which may differ from that of other countries. By doing so, 
and by focusing on non-deployed service, we can be relatively explicit about the mechanisms we 
test. Overall, our results do not suggest that military training induces violent behavior in civilian 
life, at least not in the long run. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the potential mechanisms 
linking military training to violent crime, as proposed in the psychiatric literature. Section 3 
describes the context of National Service in Australia, focusing on men who were not deployed. 
Sections 4 and 5 outline methods and data respectively. The results are presented in Section 6, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The Mechanisms Linking Military Training to Violent Crime 
Several potential mechanisms causally link military training to violent crime. These mechanisms, 
overlapping to some degree, derive from the recruit’s disconnection from a normal social 
environment, from the set of beliefs or value system inculcated by the military, and from the 
inherent nature of the training itself.  
Military training centers, or ‘camps’, remove individuals from their ‘normal’ diverse social and 
geographic environment. Recruits are moved to a single place, often rather geographically 
remote, along with a fairly similar group of people, under the aegis of a single powerful 
organization. Thus there is a sense of dislocation from a heterogeneous, open and familiar 
environment to socialization into a new, homogenous, unfamiliar, and closely controlled one. 
Such circumstances are not unique to military recruits. They may be found among religious, 
political, or corporate groups keen to socialize their members into a specific set of values and 
forms of behavior. In some respects, this might be considered a form of indoctrination. 
The environmental context of service training thus provides a fertile setting for instilling a 
particular culture. This is reinforced by explicitly setting out expectations about behavior in the 
camp and enforcing them through the use of a powerful system of incentives that reward 
conformity and punish deviance (Roberts et al. 2008). It has been argued persuasively in the 
literature that military training fosters a distinctive set of values. Arkin & Dobrofsky (1978: 166) 
suggest that the physical isolation and community insulation help to shape behavior toward a 
philosophy of ‘militarization’ among recruits: ‘The purpose of basic training is to militarize, 
which means to give a military character or to adapt for military use.’ Training to become 
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proficient in weapon handling and use, they argue, comes later. They unpack the term 
militarization to some degree by explaining it as ‘socialization into a masculine domain’. Aspects 
of masculinity, including the role of aggression and dominance in combat situations, have been 
equated positively with military performance as justification for this socialization (Eisenhart 
1975; Nicol et al. 2007). 
A recent study of German recruits provides a rare examination of the effect of military training 
on personality, arguing that the experience led to permanently muted levels of ‘agreeableness’ 
(Jackson et al. 2012). It is not clear, though, whether that was the intended result of militarization 
or simply the consequence of withdrawal from normal civilian life. ‘Agreeableness’ - one of the 
‘big five’ personality traits - has been inversely correlated with aggressive behavior because 
individuals with low levels of agreeableness tend to act in a manner that is anti-social, disengaged, 
and lacking empathy (Graziano et al. 1996; Graziano et al. 2007; Miller and Lynam 2001; 
Wilkowski et al. 2006). They also lack the cognitive processes to mitigate tension in interpersonal 
relations, and they expect hostile reactions from others (Anderson and Bushman 2002; 
Wilkowski et al. 2006). Lack of agreeableness has been associated with various life outcomes, 
including negative experiences in romantic relationships, diminished performance and 
interpersonal conflict in team-based work environments, lack of community involvement, and 
higher rates of criminality (Mount et al. 2006; Ozer and Benet-Martinez 2006). However, such 
lack of agreeableness might be considered a desirable feature of military training, because it 
enables the recruit to respond rapidly and aggressively to hostile situations. 
These ‘desired’ military traits, though, may also be relevant for violent behavior outside the 
military. Links between them and heightened levels of violence in general have been described in 
the literature. For example, masculinity has been identified with sexual violence (Morris 1996); 
dominance with violence against minority groups (Houdepohl et al. 2010); and low agreeableness 
with violent rather than conciliatory responses to interpersonal conflict (Martin et al. 2000; 
Wilkowski et al. 2006). Some authors have gone so far as to suggest that part of the 
indoctrination of military values included violence. Eisenhart (1975), for example, implies that 
systematic acts of violence were committed as part of the process of militarization.  
A further potential mechanism that links military training to violence is related to ‘strain theory’: 
the idea that being treated in a negative or aversive manner may lead to delinquent, particularly 
aggressive, behavior (Agnew 1992). Not all recruits are easily ‘militarized’ because of their 
personality or belief systems, but resisting militarization may have led to strain. So, two of 
7 
 
Agnew’s three categories of strain appear to be relevant: failure to achieve valued goals and 
negative stimuli. 
However, it is also possible that militarization fosters other, countervailing, personality traits that 
more positively affect life outcomes. These might include teamwork, respect for authority, self-
discipline, and the development of a broader skill set. So, for example, although a lack of 
agreeableness is related to anti-social behavior, teamwork may serve as an antidote to that. And, 
self-discipline may discourage hostile and aggressive behavior. In a study of World War Two and 
the Korean War, Elder and Clipp (1989) found that 54 percent of non-combat veterans reported 
improved self-discipline and 53 percent learned cooperation as a consequence of their military 
experience. Sampson and Laub (1996) have argued for the benefits of in-service education and 
training among socioeconomically disadvantaged men. More broadly, accelerated maturity 
brought on by military service can help to reduce the propensity for violent behavior, particularly 
as traits such as agreeableness strengthen with age. Publicity for military recruitment regularly 
talks about its accelerating effect on individual maturity, and training future leaders to be 
prepared to meet challenges (http://www.defencejobs.gov.au/; http://www.goarmy.com/). 
Elder (1988) discusses the enhanced developmental processes that result from military service. 
The training regime itself forms part of the militarization process for the recruit and can have a 
major bearing on the development of behavioral traits, particularly where they relate to the 
psychological preparedness for combat. Strategists in most wars have expressed concern about 
the willingness of servicemen to kill the enemy, either because of moral objection or through a 
sense of fear brought on by the shock of combat engagement. Grossman has argued that several 
training techniques developed by the US Army around the time of the Vietnam War were 
designed to desensitize troops to the trauma of killing (Grossman 1995: 249-61). For example, 
sudden rapid shooting (‘Quick Kill’) involves the soldier being trained to react spontaneously 
and intuitively without time to reflect on the act of killing. Providing greater realism through 
human-shaped shooting ranges and moving targets (‘Trainfire’) acclimatizes recruits to the 
experience of killing. By desensitizing soldiers to the violence of killing, these new techniques - 
while designed to improve operational efficiency in combat - risk breeding soldiers inured to 
committing violent crimes outside the military. Grossman’s hypothesis is predicated on earlier 
calculations by Marshall (1978) that firing rates rose dramatically during Vietnam: almost all 
American combat servicemen fired their weapons, compared with only 15 to 25 percent in 
World War Two.  
8 
 
However, Marshall’s view of World War Two has been variously criticized for both its 
methodology and observationally by war participants (Glenn 2000: 3, 30). Glenn (2000: 69-71) 
also provides evidence of training regimes in earlier wars that exposed recruits to similar realism 
scenarios; he suggests that Canada may have been the pioneer in the use of live firing half a 
century earlier, during World War One. The extent of adoption of desensitizing regimes by other 
nations has varied across time and place. For example, the superior performance of the British 
troops against the Argentinean army in 1982 during the Falklands War has been attributed to 
their earlier use of such techniques (Grossman 1995: 257-8).  
All nations’ military training regimes require recruits to develop very high levels of physical 
fitness and to become proficient in handling an array of weapons, although the precise nature 
and accomplishments will vary. It could be argued that these skills, if very well-honed, remove 
practical barriers to perpetrating certain types of violent crimes, particularly where firearms are 
used for the attack (Galiani et al. 2011:120). However, even in countries where firearms are 
readily available, only someone psychologically inclined to resort to violence is likely to exploit 
this proficiency. Moreover, such proficiency is not required to commit most acts of violence.  
To summarize, we have identified two sets of literature: one which intimates that military 
training may cause shifts in personality traits and belief systems; another that associates those 
acquired qualities with violent behavior. Nevertheless, the magnitude of such effects is not clear, 
and a direct link between military training and civilian crime has not been established. There may 
also be offsetting positive experiences from military training, as suggested above. And there are 
questions about how permanent any training-induced personality shifts are, and whether such 
behavior translates to life beyond the military. The post-mobilization influence of training is 
most likely to wane if recruits effectively distinguish between the context of their role as a soldier 
in the military and their place in civilian society. The training experience of the modern soldier 
might be viewed as preparation for a profession, with its own set of values and experiences 
unique to that role, and which the recruit can separate from civilian life. Age at enlistment, the 
length and precise nature of training, and whether recruitment is voluntary or by conscription all 
may bear on the behavioral impact. Younger, less mature recruits may be more susceptible to 
changes in personality traits. The impact also may be greater with longer continuous service. 
And, as we saw above, the specific nature of the training matters. Conscripts trained for a limited 
period of time compared with the volunteer recruits, but their enforced entry into the military 
may have contributed to a more serious effect on personality.  
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In the following section, we investigate those mechanisms empirically through an examination of 
the nature of military training in the Australian army during the Vietnam period.  
 
3. National Service in Australia 
The Australian conscription ballots resulted in the enlistment of 63,735 National Servicemen 
(‘Nashos’), after allowing for a range of exemptions and deferments. They all began their two 
years of service in the regular army with a period of training in Australia. After this, 18,654 (29 
percent) of them spent part of their service, typically one year, in Vietnam; the rest mainly served 
their time in Australia. All Nashos subsequently completed three years in the reserves in 
Australia. In this section, we analyze the nature of the training that all Australian recruits 
received, and compare it to the American experience, to learn about the possible relationship 
between military training and behavioral traits associated with heightened levels of violence.  
Training occurred in three stages: ten weeks of general recruit training, followed by three months 
with a particular Corps, and finally a similar period training with the assigned unit. The initial 
stage targeted high levels of physical fitness and some general military skills. The Corps training 
focused on learning the particular functional skills and operational requirements of a Corps 
member, whether infantry, tanks, engineering, or artillery. For those units destined for Vietnam, 
there was further specialized training at the Jungle Training Centre at Canundra (QLD) and 
through participation in group test exercises at Shoalwater Bay (QLD) (Fett et al. 1984; Ham 
2007; O'Brien 1995). This was similar in length and nature to American training for Vietnam, 
which consisted of eight weeks of ‘basic’ training, nine weeks of ‘advanced individual training’ by 
function, and up to three months of training with the unit (Glenn 2000: 52-5). 
Nashos trained full time in military camps where they were separated from their customary social 
and geographic environment. This was part of a strategy of immersion in a new social structure, 
to acclimatize recruits to the way of military life. The three recruit training camps - at Kapooka 
(NSW), Singleton (NSW), and Puckapunyal (VIC) - were located outside major population 
centers. Leave was granted fairly infrequently, and only after five weeks of the program. 
Nonetheless, the extent of isolation should not be exaggerated. Travelling to nearby towns was 
relatively straightforward and leisure activities, such as trout fishing, were available in scenic areas 
close to the camps (O'Brien 1995: 8). Camp visitors were allowed on particular dates, as were 
some phone calls after three weeks; and, many recruits wrote regularly to family and friends 
(Quigley unpublished). 
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Contact with the outside world was most constrained during recruitment training, because this 
was the main period in which the army sought to modify attitudes and behavior, the so-called 
‘militarization’ of recruits. Their memoirs describe intense hard work, overlain with the endless 
voice of corporals and sergeant majors shouting verbal abuse (‘hazing’), including sexual 
innuendo and sometimes xenophobic language. The recruits learned to conform strictly so as to 
avoid demeaning individual or group punishments and chores that only added to their workload. 
Ray Andrews wrote to his family from Puckapunyal: ‘I’ve worked 42 hours out of the last 55, 
and I start at 5.00 am tomorrow for a 14-hour shift – Whacko!’ and later: ‘I hate this rotten hole’ 
(Donnelly 2001: 202, 203). Brian Hennessy similarly noted: ‘Most nights saw us collapse 
exhausted onto our bunks’ (Hennessy 1997: 9). In addition to the physical exhaustion, they 
believed the training was designed to mitigate their sense of individualism (Rintoul 1987: 19). 
Although there was much in the atmosphere and life of the camps that recruits found unpleasant 
and stressful, most of them learned to cope with these demands. Friendship, humour, and 
sometimes disdain helped them to deal with the verbal onslaughts. They adapted and, at the end, 
some believed it had been a maturing process and felt pride at emerging as a professional soldier 
(Hennessy 1997: 3). While this environment clearly bred a sense of masculinity, physical 
assertiveness in military tasks, and self-confidence, it is less obvious that it translated into general 
aggression outside of the military and in a desire to be dominant and less agreeable. Certain 
positive aspects to the training, as we hypothesized in Section 2, may have offset some of these 
more egregious characterizations, including: building self-discipline, leadership, friendship, 
camaraderie, and team work (Donnelly 2001: xi, 94; Ham 2007: 174; Rintoul 1987: 13). Both 
teamwork and strong character were explicitly mentioned among the goals of training (Training 
Information Report unpublished-a: 29 April 1970). Since most Nashos were put into the infantry 
corps to help boost its numbers rapidly, many groups of recruits who had built up teamwork 
through their initial training remained together. 
American recruits encountered a comparable training regime, particularly the ‘shock, separation 
and disorientation’ of ‘boot’ camp, the masculine environment, and the surrender of 
individuality’ (Ebert 1993: 25-8). Their training syllabi, and the evidence of officers, paints a 
similar picture of confidence building and teamwork as highly valued attributes (Glenn 2000: 39, 
53). However, there were differences in the training regimes of the two nations. McNeill (1984: 
195) believes that the American training was designed to prepare troops for expected large-scale 
battles with the invading North Vietnamese, which motivated more aggressive forms of training 
(Ebert 1993: 46-8). Norman Simpson, who served for Australia in Korea, Malaya, and Vietnam 
appears to confirm these differences in attitude during his conversation with an American 
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soldier: ‘He said that most Americans believed in the "Wild West" syndrome. The gun is 
supreme. That, I now believe, is the background mentality of the American Army’ (Simpson 
unpublished: 27). 
Drawing upon their experiences in Malaya in the 1950s, Australians trained for a war of less 
overt aggression and more counter-insurgency stealth, requiring careful marksmanship, jungle 
patrols, and occasional ambushes (McNeill 1984: 195). This necessitated small units surviving in 
a harsh tropical climate and conducting a covert, searching strategy that rarely involved 
significant contact with the enemy. It also emphasized minor engineering skills, such as using 
winches, searching for tunnels, and maintaining functioning weapons in humid conditions (ATF 
Lessons learnt). America’s decision not to train for counter-insurgency until well into the 
Vietnam War has been studied (Longley 2008: 67; Westheider 2007: 61). 
As the war developed, pacification skills - working in close contact with the Vietnamese civilian 
population – also were needed, along with the deployment of trade skills to help rebuild 
damaged community infrastructure (Exercise Unison). Australian training syllabi included 
languages and culture and provided advice on relations with the Vietnamese people: ‘troops must 
not only be trained to operate effectively against their enemies in the field, they must also be 
taught to play their part correctly in ….the campaign to win the support of the people. …, a 
willingness to co-operate, to share resources with civilian agencies and to behave sympathetically 
towards the people of the country.’ (‘Quelling Insurgency’). In the American training there 
appears to have been only limited attempts to understand Vietnamese society and culture (Ebert 
1993: 49-53; Westheider 2007: 51-2). 
While recruit training shaped overall attitudes and behavior, the Corps stage focused on 
development of specific skills. To become a professional soldier, the recruits were expected to 
achieve proficiency in driving, navigation, communication, simple engineering, and first aid, 
along with a set of specific Corps functions (Ducker Papers). Most of the skills were designed to 
support the servicemen in combat, but they competed for time with training that was more 
directly related to battle, such as weapons handling and marksmanship. Thus, a relatively limited 
amount of time was dedicated to activities that were more likely to promote traits such as 
aggression, dominance, and lack of agreeableness.  
In Section 2 we saw that two new techniques introduced by the American army have been 
associated with desensitizing servicemen to the act of killing (Grossman 1995). In Australia 
Trainfire was introduced in 1958 to improve target practice, but by 1966 there were concerns 
about its effectiveness. The discussion was not about whether it managed to personify the enemy 
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and thus contribute to the realism of killing, but rather its operational inflexibility: it focused on 
firing at a 25-meter range target, whereas target detection, close-quarter firing practice, and firing 
during assault all were considered to be more important (Training Information Bulletin 13 1966: 
4). The Americans introduced Quick Kill in 1967 as a form of spontaneous and aggressive 
shooting (Ebert 1993: 54) and during Vietnam training, techniques and tactics regularly were 
shared between the allies, either through joint exercises, joint seminars, or circulation of the US 
Training Information Bulletins. However, the Americans’ training practices were not accepted 
uncritically. The Military Board in Australia in 1968 trialled and discussed whether to adopt 
‘Quick Kill’, but by August 1969 it had decided that, ‘the US Quick Kill method of rifle shooting 
will not be adopted in Australia’ (21 August 1969 letter). Accurate marksmanship in a variety of 
situations was viewed as more important than continuous shooting. In Australia there were 
concerns about the appropriateness of Quick Kill for the conflict in Vietnam: ‘Quick Kill … is 
often difficult to use in Phuoc Tuy province where it is necessary to apply Rules of Engagement 
and therefore make a positive identification or at least discount the possibility of friendly 
troops/innocent civilians before engaging or movement’ (Training Information Report 
unpublished-b: 8.11.70). Although the American Army trained using Quick Kill techniques, it 
was also conscious of the sacrifice of accuracy that it involved (Glenn 2000: 68). 
Australian personnel in Vietnam alluded in their reports to concerns that newly-arrived recruits 
were wary or even frightened of live ammunition, grenades, or mines. So-called ‘peacetime 
restrictions’ meant that live fire could not be used near recruits in training scenarios. These issues 
were noted in 1966, and were still being discussed as late as 1971 when it was observed: ‘Live 
artillery firing cannot be conducted anywhere near our own troops...so restrictive as to lose all 
realism. It is accepted that a ‘safety first’ policy will always apply to training in Australia, but 
safety regulations should be flexible enough to allow more realistic conditions’ (Training 
Information Report unpublished-b: 27.7.1971). Thus, while some troops who served in Vietnam 
would have encountered combat situations with live fire, the majority who remained in Australia 
were not exposed to the realism, or even to an effective simulation, of live fire at close quarters 
which might have inured them to acts of violence. In contrast, although it had been suspended 
between 1945 and 1950, American infantry training included live firing in the vicinity of recruits 
by the time of Vietnam. However, it appears to have been directed well away from troops and 
the general experience fell far short of a realistic battle environment (Glenn 2000: 74). Ebert 
(1993: 149) summarizes that recruits were ‘rarely prepared for the confusion and noise, the chaos 
and disorder, or the death and suffering encountered in battle.’  
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4. Methods 
The empirical approach that we adopt exploits the randomness of the conscription lotteries. It is 
similar to recent Australian research (Siminski and Ville 2011, 2012; Siminski forthcoming), 
which in turn is based on related US work (some examples are Angrist 1990; Lindo and Stoecker 
forthcoming and many others). 
Our primary aim is to estimate the effect of army training (not deployment, or combat) on 
various measures of individual crime perpetration, especially violent crime. Crime perpetration 
(y) by person i in birth cohort j is expressed in equation (1) as a linear function of army training 
(r), birth cohort fixed-effects (a) and other individual-level determinants of crime perpetration 
(m).  
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗          (1) 
b is the causal parameter of interest. If army service had been randomly assigned within birth 
cohorts, OLS estimation of (1) would yield unbiased estimates of b. Despite the conscription 
lotteries, army service was not randomly assigned. In particular, many potential conscripts were 
screened-out in the medical examination, while many ‘balloted-out’ men joined the army 
voluntarily. Therefore, r is almost certainly correlated with m and OLS estimation of (1) would 
likely yield biased and inconsistent estimates of b.  
Adding control variables is not a satisfactory solution, because some determinants of crime 
perpetration are inevitably unobservable. Instead, we use 2SLS. The (binary) conscription lottery 
ballot outcome (z) is a randomly assigned source of variation in the probability of army service. z 
could be used as a single instrument for army service in a just-identified first-stage regression. 
Instead, we allow the effect (p) of the ballot outcome to vary between birth cohorts: 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝜋𝑗𝑧𝑖𝑗 + 𝛾𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗          (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) specify an over-identified 2SLS model, where 𝜋𝑗 is the (first-stage) effect of 
ballot outcome on the probability of army enlistment for men in birth cohort j. This approach 
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yields more precise estimates than the just-identified alternative, because the effect of the ballot 
outcome on the probability of being enlisted in the army varies between cohorts.8 
In our preferred analysis, we restrict the sample to the three youngest cohorts (men born 
between January 1951 and June 1952), because conscripts from these cohorts were not deployed 
to Vietnam, or to any other combat area. 
Then we repeat the analysis using the same specification, with the sample extended to the full set 
of 15 birth cohorts (men born between January 1945 and June 1952.) We interpret these 
estimates as upper bounds on the effect of army training, on the assumption that deployment to 
Vietnam did not reduce subsequent crime perpetration, on average.9 
We also produce a third set of estimates, again using all 15 cohorts, in a specification that 
separately identifies the effect (br) of army training and the additional effect (bv) of deployment 
to Vietnam (v). Here, the substantive equation is: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗         (3) 
where r and v are both endogenous and both instrumented by the same set of 15 IVs (the ballot 
outcome in each cohort). This strategy relies on the fact that the probability of deployment 
varied considerably between cohorts of conscripts. 
In each specification, individual-level data needed to estimate the second-stage regression are not 
available. However, a group-means approach yields identical point estimates to that of individual 
data, as well as consistently estimated standard errors (Angrist 1991; Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
Here, each group is an exact DOB. For example, the 2SLS estimates that correspond to the 
specification in equation (1) are obtained by GLS estimation of: 
𝑦�𝑑𝑗 = 𝛽𝑟�𝑧𝑗 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜇𝑑𝑗          (4) 
                                                 
8 Using just-identified models, the standard errors of the key estimates are approximately 1% 
(5%) larger for the 3-cohort (15-cohort) specification. Results from just-identified models are 
qualitatively similar, and are shown as a robustness test. 
9 This assumption is supported by positive point-estimates of the effect of deployment in almost 
all of the models where deployment is explicitly considered. These results are shown in Section 
6. 
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Each observation in (4) is an exact DOB, denoted by the subscript d,  𝑦�𝑑𝑗 is the mean number of 
crimes committed by men with a given DOB; and 𝑟�𝑧𝑗 is the proportion of men who served in 
the army, by ballot outcome and birth cohort. In other words, 𝑟�𝑧𝑗 is the predicted value from (2). 
The GLS weights are equal to the number of men with each DOB. Robust standard errors are 
shown in the results for each specification. 
Each of the three versions of the analysis has pros and cons. When restricted to the youngest 
three cohorts, the analysis provides the cleanest estimates of army training, and thus is preferred. 
Estimates from the second specification, which uses all 15 cohorts and does not include v, are 
more precise but may be biased upwards. The third specification avoids this limitation, as well as 
yielding more precise estimates than the version restricted to younger cohorts. However, it 
assumes that among army service compliers, between-cohort differences in the probability of 
deployment are the only explanation for corresponding cohort differences in the effect of army 
service. While this is a plausible assumption, it is not as clean as restricting the sample to non-
deployed cohorts. Ultimately, the strongest results are those that are consistent across each of 
the three versions of the analysis. 
 
5. Data Construction 
The first-stage individual-level database contains the universe of men in the relevant birth 
cohorts who were in Australia at age 20. It has been described in detail in Siminski 
(forthcoming). It was constructed from military personnel records and official population 
estimates from the 1960s and 1970s. Because recent migrants cannot be excluded from the 
second-stage (crime) database, the first-stage data also include synthesized records for migrants 
who arrived in Australia after the age of 20, in proportion to their fraction of each age cohort in 
2006 (as recorded in Census data). This is for consistency with the second-stage data, and is the 
same approach used in Siminski (forthcoming) and (Siminski and Ville 2012) whenever recent 
migrants are not identifiable, and hence cannot be excluded from the second-stage data. 
To construct the second-stage database, we draw on administrative data from criminal court 
cases heard during 1994-2010 in New South Wales, Victoria, and Queensland. These are the 
three largest Australian states and contain over 77% of the Australian population. During those 
years, the study population was middle-aged (41-65 years). Although crime rates for this age 
group are lower than for younger males, the data still include a substantial number of crimes. As 
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shown in Table 1, they include 496,107 criminal offenses with male defendants born between 
January 1945 and June 1952, of which 344,477 received guilty verdicts. In our preferred 
specifications, the offenses are grouped into cases, of which there are 164,211 with at least one 
guilty verdict.10 One-fifth of these cases are violent crimes; around one quarter are for drunk 
driving; and 13% were property crimes.11 Some 7,748 cases (5%) resulted in imprisonment, most 
of which were non-violent cases. 
With some exceptions, these data contain the universe of offenses heard by criminal courts in 
these states over this period. However, the coverage window begins in mid-1994 for Queensland 
and in 1995 for Victoria. Further, the QLD data prior to 2001 do not include cases heard in 
provincial courts. There is no reason to suspect that such missing data would disproportionately 
affect balloted-in or balloted-out men, thus introducing bias. And in any case, the results are not 
sensitive to the exclusion of pre-2001 QLD data, or indeed to the exclusion of QLD overall. 
Figure 1, which shows frequency counts of cases with at least one guilty offense by state and 
year, illustrates the likely extent of missing pre-2001 data in QLD. It also shows a general 
downward trend for each state, consistent with the aging of the study population.  
We combine the crime data with counts of men living in NSW, QLD, and VIC combined, by 
exact DOB as recorded in the 2006 Census. For each DOB, we construct a set of outcome 
variables equal to the ratio of various crime counts to men. Across DOBs, the mean ratio of 
(guilty) criminal cases to men living in these states is 0.26, as illustrated in more detail in the next 
section. 
                                                 
10 A case is a set of one or more offenses heard on the same date for the same defendant. The 
results are not sensitive to analyzing offenses rather than cases, but are less precise due to a 
highly skewed distribution of the number of offenses within cases. 
11 Offenses are classified under the 2008 Australian Standard Offense Classification (ASOC) 
(ABS 2008). Violent offenses are those with a 4-digit ASOC code below 0630. This includes 
homicide and related offenses; acts intended to cause injury; sexual assault and related offenses; 
dangerous or negligent acts endangering persons; abduction, harassment and other offenses 
against the person; robbery, extortion and related offenses. Non-violent offenses are all other 
offenses. Drunk driving offenses are those where the ASOC code is 1431. Property offenses are 
those with 4-digit ASOC codes ranging from 0600 to 1030. This includes robbery, extortion and 
related offenses; unlawful entry with intent/burglary, break and enter; theft and related offenses; 
fraud, deception and related offenses; and illicit drug offenses (excluding possession, use or 
miscellaneous drug offenses).  
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6. Results 
6.1 First-stage Results 
First-stage results are shown in Table 2. The upper panel reports estimates from the preferred 
specification, which is restricted to the youngest three birth cohorts and has only one 
endogenous variable (army service). The lower panel shows first-stage results for the full sample, 
drawn from all fifteen 6-month birth cohorts. In each case, the ballot outcome effect is allowed 
to vary between birth cohorts; therefore the models are over-identified. 
The coefficients on the instruments are smaller than those previously reported (for example in 
Siminski forthcoming), which reflects the inclusion of recent migrants in the data here. 
Nevertheless, the ballot outcome is a strong predictor of army service for each birth cohort, 
inducing between 10 and 25 percent of this sample of balloted-in men into the army. For all but 
the youngest three cohorts, the ballot outcome is also a strong predictor of deployment to 
Vietnam. 
In each regression, the first-stage relationships are very strong, as shown by the various first-
stage F-statistics reported, all of which exceed 900.  
6.2 Visual Presentation of Reduced-Form Results 
Figure 2 is a detailed graphical summary of the reduced-form relationship between ballot-
outcome and crime, similar to Lindo & Stoecker (2012). Much of the intuition of the results, 
including the precision of the estimates, is conveyed through these nine graphs. Each shows the 
ratio of crimes to population, by birth cohort and ballot outcome. In each graph, there is an 
upward trend from left to right, probably because the data availability window covers a different 
age range for each cohort. For example, the data include crimes at approximately ages 49-66 for 
the oldest cohort (shown on the left side of each graph), and for ages 41-58 for the youngest 
cohort. 
Panel A shows the crime-to-population ratios for all criminal cases with a guilty verdict. Within 
each cohort, the difference between balloted-in and balloted-out DOBs is small and is 
sometimes positive, but often negative. This suggests that any effects of army service on overall 
crime likely will be small, but precisely estimated. Similar patterns are shown in each of the nine 
figures, which differ primarily in their extent of variation, likely reflecting the volume of crimes 
in each category. For example, the last four graphs show results for crimes resulting in 
imprisonment, derived from relatively few cases (as shown in Table 1). 
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6.3 2SLS estimates 
The 2SLS estimates are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5, one table for each of the specifications 
described in Section 4. Each table shows estimates from nine separate 2SLS models, each for a 
distinct category of crime rates as the dependent variable. The mean of each dependent variable 
is shown, along with estimated army service coefficients and their robust standard errors. 
However, the two columns on the right side are of primary interest. The second from right 
columns express the point estimates as percentages of the mean of the dependent variable. The 
far right columns show the upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals, expressed as a 
percentage of the mean of the dependent variable. They illustrate the magnitude of the smallest 
crime effects that can be ruled out with 95% confidence. 
Table 3 shows estimates from the preferred specification, which identifies the effect of army 
training in Australia by selecting only a sample of birth cohorts from which conscripts were not 
deployed. For every category of crime, the point estimates are negative. They suggest, for 
example, that army training reduces overall crime perpetration by 12% (relative to the mean crime 
rate), violent crime by 36%, non-violent crime by 6%, property crime by 29%, and drunk driving 
by 19%. These point estimates also suggest that army training reduces the rate of crimes that 
result in imprisonment by 68%, with similar results when violent and non-violent crimes are 
treated separately. However, none of these estimates are statistically different from zero at the 
5% level of significance, so their precision is of primary importance to interpretation. The far 
right column shows that with 95% confidence one can rule out any positive violent crime effects 
larger than 3.6%. One also can rule out effects larger than 15% for drunk driving, 20% for 
overall crime, 30% for property crimes, and 30% for non-violent crimes. Of course the 
estimated effects on crimes resulting in imprisonment are less precise. They show that effects 
larger than 36% relative to the mean can be ruled out with 95% confidence. 
Table 4 shows the results from models with the same specification, estimated with an expanded 
sample that is drawn from all 15 birth cohorts subjected to the conscription lotteries. Army 
training remains the only endogenous variable, despite the fact that some conscripts from the 
older birth cohorts were deployed to Vietnam. Under the assumption that deployment to 
Vietnam did not reduce crime, these estimates are treated as conservative upper bounds of the 
true effects of army training. Because of the expanded sample, this table shows a set of estimates 
with substantially smaller standard errors. Here the point estimates are quite close to zero for 
most of the key models. The estimated effect of army service on crime overall is +0.4% relative 
to the mean, -0.1% for violent crime, +0.5% for non-violent crime, +0.6% for property crime, 
and +3.5% for drunk driving. None of these estimates are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Again, the far right column is of primary interest. It shows that overall crime effects any larger 
than 11% relative to the mean can be ruled out with 95% confidence. Violent crime effects 
above 15% also can be ruled out, as can non-violent crime effects above 12%, property crimes 
effects above 22%, drunk driving effects above 17%, and effects on crimes resulting in 
imprisonment above 22%. 
Table 5 shows further results generated from the full sample of birth cohorts, this time with the 
inclusion of deployment to Vietnam as a second endogenous regressor. Consistent with the 
earlier results, the estimated effects of army training are never statistically significant. Further, the 
point estimates are often negative, again consistent with earlier results, especially for violent 
crime. Taken in isolation, these estimates rule out violent crimes effects any larger than 21% 
relative to the mean rate with 95% confidence, and they rule out effects larger than 25% on 
crime overall. For each outcome, the estimated coefficients of v are not statistically significant, 
but they are not precise enough to draw any meaningful conclusions about the effects of 
deployment to Vietnam. 
As a further robustness test, we show alternate 2SLS estimates in Tables 6 and 7. These were 
generated using just-identified models, which are otherwise identical to the models used for 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively. These estimates are similar to the main results, but slightly less 
precise. The upper bound of the estimated violent crime effect (6.9% relative to the mean violent 
crime rate; see Table 6) is slightly higher than the preferred estimate. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Recent research suggests that exposure to military combat may lead to violent behavior in later 
civilian life. However, it has been hypothesized that military service also may lead to civilian 
violence simply through the training experience, especially the process of ‘militarization’ and the 
indoctrination into an intensely masculine culture and belief system, explicitly designed to 
prepare soldiers for engagement in violent warfare. Because the number of people who receive 
military training is likely far greater than the number who see combat, the potential importance 
of this mechanism may be greater than that of combat. Young adults may experience other 
substantial changes in their cultural environment - including their social, occupational or 
institutional group affiliation - which can also contribute to their identity. Thus, the extent to 
which the relatively intense experience of military training induces negative behavior, including 
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violence, may be indicative of the vulnerability of young adults to being shaped by culture or 
environment. 
Alternatively, the positive aspects of the military training experience - such as teamwork, respect 
for authority, and self-discipline - may offset the hypothesized negative effects. Indeed, there is 
little empirical evidence that military training increases the rate of civilian violence. We contribute 
to the literature on that question, using the exogenous variation provided by Australia’s 
conscription lotteries, and we also find no evidence for such an effect. Three alternate 
specifications all yield negative (but statistically insignificant) point estimates. The estimate from 
our preferred specification allows us to rule out any positive effect larger than 3.6% (relative to 
the mean crime rate), with 95% confidence. 
Our results have caveats and thus may not necessarily apply in other contexts. In particular, the 
criminal offense data only cover the study population’s middle-age years. While young males 
have higher crime rates, we believe that our estimates are precise enough to be meaningful. 
Nevertheless, we cannot test for crime effects that occur shortly after army service. However, we 
can rule out any substantial ‘permanent’ effects.12 
Of course these results are also contingent on the specific context of Australian conscript 
training. It took place for a period of two years at most, and among men who were mainly 20 
years of age when they enlisted. Training involved character shaping with positive as well as 
potentially negative elements. Training skills were wide, varied, and often unrelated to acts of 
combat. Even among those not deployed to Vietnam, recruits were prepared for a war of covert 
counter-insurgency rather than for large scale battles. This training may have been less realistic or 
desensitizing than in the US, because live rounds and ‘Quick Kill’ training techniques were not 
used. Australian training also included ‘softer’ pacification skills, motivated by the need for close 
cooperation with Vietnamese civilians in Australia’s role in the war. 
  
                                                 
12 While Lindo & Stoeker’s (forthcoming) focus is on all military service (including combat), the 
violent crime effects that they find are only statistically significant for periods soon after military 
service. Similar to our analysis, their estimates for later periods are statistically insignificant. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Summary of Criminal Court Data (1994-2010) 
  NSW VIC QLD Total 
Offenses Heard 155,506 186,278 154,323 496,107 
Offenses With a Guilty Verdict 129,705 102,540 112,232 344,477 
Cases with at least 1 Guilty Offense 
   Violent 15,399 7,883 9,628 32,910 
   Non-Violent 53,523 36,085 41,693 131,301 
   Property 8,910 7,412 5,636 21,958 
   Drunk driving 22,146 9,103 10,969 42,218 
All Cases with at least 1 Guilty Offense 68,922 43,968 51,321 164,211 
Cases resulting in Imprisonment 
   Violent 1,477 596 771 2,844 
   Non-Violent 2,433 1,395 1,076 4,904 
All Cases resulting in imprisonment 3,910 1,991 1,847 7,748 
 
Notes:  The data contain criminal court cases with male defendants born between January 1945 
and June 1952, heard during 1994-2010. Definitions of violent, non-violent, property and drunk 
driving are in footnote 11. 
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Table 2 First-stage Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable 
   Army Service (r) Deployment to Vietnam (v) 
Instrumental variable  
estimated 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
estimated 
coefficient 
(robust 
standard 
error) 
Preferred sample (i.e. restricted to youngest 3 birth cohorts) 
     
ballot outcome (cohort 13) .1681*** (.0027)   
ballot outcome (cohort 14) .1529*** (.0028)   
ballot outcome (cohort 15) .1025*** (.0024)   
     
F-stat for IVs 2,844   
N 210,456   
     
Full sample (all 15 birth cohorts) 
     
ballot outcome (cohort 1) .2471*** (.0026) .0909*** (.0019) 
ballot outcome (cohort 2) .2377*** (.0031) .0908*** (.0022) 
ballot outcome (cohort 3) .2132*** (.0034) .0895*** (.0025) 
ballot outcome (cohort 4) .2197*** (.0035) .1075*** (.0027) 
ballot outcome (cohort 5) .2030*** (.0033) .0971*** (.0025) 
ballot outcome (cohort 6) .1968*** (.0035) .1034*** (.0027) 
ballot outcome (cohort 7) .2015*** (.0033) .0931*** (.0024) 
ballot outcome (cohort 8) .2154*** (.0038) .0861*** (.0027) 
ballot outcome (cohort 9) .2011*** (.0031) .0683*** (.0021) 
ballot outcome (cohort 10) .2036*** (.0040) .0468*** (.0023) 
ballot outcome (cohort 11) .1935*** (.0039) .0246*** (.0018) 
ballot outcome (cohort 12) .1870*** (.0033) .0049*** (.0010) 
ballot outcome (cohort 13) .1681*** (.0027) .0004 (.0007) 
ballot outcome (cohort 14) .1529*** (.0028) .0006 (.0006) 
ballot outcome (cohort 15) .1025*** (.0024) -.0010** (.0004) 
     
F-stat for IVs 3,833 947 
Angrist-Pischke Multivariate 
F-stat 
1,860 919 
N 1,030,740 1,030,740 
 
Notes: The upper panel reports key estimates from a first-stage regression of army service (r) on 
3 instruments (a binary conscription ballot outcome indicator for each birth cohort). The lower 
panel reports corresponding first-stage regression results for army service and for deployment to 
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Vietnam (v), using the full sample, drawn from all 15 birth cohorts. Each regression includes 
birth cohort fixed-effects. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 3 2SLS Results – Preferred Specification (Non-Deployed Cohorts Only) 
  mean of 
dependent 
variable 
Estimated 2SLS effects 
Endogenous variable 
Point estimates 
(robust S.E.s) 
Point estimate 
as % of mean 
95% CI 
Upper bound 
as % of mean 
 
A. Dependent Variable: All crimes 
Army service (r) .326 -.039 (.0526) -12% 20% 
 
 
    B. Dependent Variable: Violent crimes 
Army service (r) .064 -.023 (.0129) -36% 3.6% 
 
 
    C. Dependent Variable: Non-violent crimes 
Army service (r) .262 -.016 (.0477) -6% 30% 
 
 
    D. Dependent Variable: Property crimes 
Army service (r) .045 -.013 (.0133) -29% 30% 
      
 E. Drunk driving Crimes 
Army service (r) .081 -.015 (.0141) -19% 15% 
 
 
    F. Crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .016 -.011 (.0083) -68% 36% 
 
  
   G. Violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 -.003 (.0037) -58% 81% 
 
 
    H. Non-violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .010 -.008 (.0066) -72% 51% 
      
 I. Property crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .006 -.001 (.0051) -15% 143% 
 
Notes: This table shows 2SLS estimates of the effect of army training on subsequent crime 
perpetration. Each of the nine panels contains results for a particular category of criminal 
offenses. Cases with one or more guilty verdict are included. The sample is restricted to men in 
the youngest three conscription-eligible birth cohorts (those born between January 1951 and 
June 1952). Conscripts from these cohorts served only in Australia. A GLS group-means 
approach is utilized, where the groups are exact dates of birth (DOBs) and the weights are the 
number of men with each DOB living in NSW, VIC or QLD. In each model, N = 547 DOBs, 
representing 127,478 men. Each model includes birth cohort fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 4 2SLS Results – All 15 Birth Cohorts  
  
mean of 
dependent 
variable 
Estimated 2SLS effects 
Endogenous variable 
Point estimates 
(robust S.E.s) 
Point estimate 
as % of mean 
95% CI 
Upper bound 
as % of mean 
 
A. Dependent Variable: All crimes 
Army service (r) .264 .001 (.0144) 0.4% 11% 
 
 
    B. Dependent Variable: Violent crimes 
Army service (r) .053 .000 (.0041) -0.1% 15% 
 
 
    C. Dependent Variable: Non-violent crimes 
Army service (r) .211 .001 (.0128) 0.5% 12% 
 
 
    D. Dependent Variable: Property crimes 
Army service (r) .035 .000 (.0039) 0.6% 22% 
      
 E. Drunk driving Crimes 
Army service (r) .068 .002 (.0046) 3.5% 17% 
 
 
    F. Crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .012 -.002 (.0024) -16.1% 22% 
 
  
   G. Violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 .001 (.0013) 30.3% 84% 
 
 
    H. Non-violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .008 -.003 (.0018) -43.0% 3% 
      
 I. Property crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 -.002 (.0014) -43.1% 17% 
 
Notes: This table shows 2SLS estimates of the effect of army training on subsequent crime 
perpetration. Each of the nine panels contains results for a particular category of criminal 
offenses. Cases with one or more guilty verdict are included. The sample includes men from all 
15 conscription-eligible birth cohorts (those born between January 1945 and June 1952). A GLS 
group-means approach is utilised, where the groups are exact dates of birth (DOBs) and the 
weights are the number of men with each DOB living in NSW, VIC or QLD. In each model, N 
= 2,738 DOBs, representing 621,283 men. Each model includes birth cohort fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
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Table 5 2SLS Results with Two Endogenous Variables 
  
mean of 
dependent 
variable 
Estimated 2SLS effects 
Endogenous variables 
point estimates 
(robust S.E.s) 
point estimate 
as % of mean 
95% CI 
Upper bound 
as % of mean 
 
A. Dependent Variable: All crimes 
Army service (r) 
.264 
-.005 (.0364) -2% 25% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .020 (.0946) 8% 78% 
      B. Dependent Variable: Violent crimes 
Army service (r) 
.053 
-.008 (.0096) -15% 21% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .024 (.0253) 46% 139% 
      C. Dependent Variable: Non-violent crimes 
Army service (r) 
.211 
.002 (.0326) 1% 31% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) -.004 (.0843) -2% 76% 
      D. Dependent Variable: Property crimes 
Army service (r) 
.035 
-.007 (.0100) -19% 37% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .021 (.0253) 60% 201% 
 
 
    E. Drunk driving Crimes 
Army service (r) 
.068 
.001 (.0104) 2% 32% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .003 (.0279) 5% 85% 
      F. Crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) 
.012 
-.004 (.0062) -31% 32% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .006 (.0162) 46% 301% 
  
 
   G. Violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) 
.005 
.000 (.0030) -2% 126% 
Deployment to (v) .005 (.0079) 100% 439% 
      H. Non-violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) 
.008 
-.004 (.0049) -48% 74% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .001 (.0125) 14% 325% 
 
 
    
 I. Property crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) 
.005 
-.002 (.0039) -45% 118% 
Deployment to Vietnam (v) .000 (.0098) 7% 419% 
 
Notes: This table shows 2SLS estimates of the independent effects of army service and the 
additional effects of deployment to Vietnam (as per equation (3)) on subsequent crime 
perpetration. Each of the nine panels contains results for a particular category of criminal 
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offenses. Cases with one or more guilty verdict are included. The sample includes men from all 
15 conscription-eligible birth cohorts (those born between January 1945 and June 1952). A GLS 
group-means approach is utilised, where the groups are exact dates of birth (DOBs) and the 
weights are the number of men with each DOB living in NSW, VIC or QLD. In each model, N 
= 2,738 DOBs, representing 621,283 men. Each model includes birth cohort fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6 Robustness Test – 2SLS Results – Just-Identified Specification (Non-Deployed Cohorts 
Only) 
  mean of 
dependent 
variable 
Estimated 2SLS effects 
Endogenous variable 
Point estimates 
(robust S.E.s) 
Point estimate 
as % of mean 
Upper bound 
as % of mean 
 A. Dependent Variable: All crimes 
Army service (r) .326 -.049 (.0527) -15% 17% 
 
 
    B. Dependent Variable: Violent crimes 
Army service (r) .064 -.021 (.0132) -33% 6.9% 
 
 
    C. Dependent Variable: Non-violent crimes 
Army service (r) .262 -.028 (.0473) -11% 25% 
 
 
    D. Dependent Variable: Property crimes 
Army service (r) .045 -.013 (.0134) -28% 31% 
      
 E. Drunk driving Crimes 
Army service (r) .081 -.015 (.0150) -18% 18% 
 
 
    F. Crimes resulting in Imprisonment
Army service (r) .016 -.012 (.0083) -76% 29% 
 
  
   G. Violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 -.003 (.0037) -62% 79% 
 
 
    H. Non-violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .010 -.009 (.0066) -84% 42% 
      
 I. Property crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .006 -.001 (.0052) -14% 145% 
 
Notes: This table shows an alternate set of 2SLS results as a robustness test. These results were 
generated using a set of just-identified models, which are otherwise identical to the models used 
for the Table 3 results. See also Table 3 notes. 
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Table 7 Robustness Test – 2SLS Results – Just-Identified Specification (All 15 Cohorts) 
  mean of 
dependent 
variable 
Estimated 2SLS effects 
Endogenous variable 
Point estimates 
(robust S.E.s) 
Point estimate 
as % of mean 
Upper bound 
as % of mean 
 A. Dependent Variable: All crimes 
Army service (r) .264 -.002 (.0152) -0.9% 10% 
 
 
    B. Dependent Variable: Violent crimes 
Army service (r) .053 -.001 (.0042) -1.2% 14% 
 
 
    C. Dependent Variable: Non-violent crimes 
Army service (r) .211 -.002 (.0135) -0.8% 12% 
 
 
    D. Dependent Variable: Property crimes 
Army service (r) .035 .000 (.0041) -0.8% 22% 
 
 
    
 E. Drunk driving Crimes 
Army service (r) .068 .002 (.0048) 2.5% 16% 
 
 
    F. Crimes resulting in Imprisonment
Army service (r) .012 -.003 (.0026) -21.0% 19% 
 
 
 
   G. Violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 .001 (.0013) 25.9% 82% 
 
 
    H. Non-violent crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .008 -.004 (.0019) -48.3% 0% 
 
 
    
 I. Property crimes resulting in Imprisonment 
Army service (r) .005 -.002 (.0015) -39.9% 24% 
 
Notes: This table shows an alternate set of 2SLS results as a robustness test. These results were 
generated using a set of just-identified models, which are otherwise identical to the models used 
for the Table 4 results. See also Table 4 notes. 
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Figure 1  Frequency Counts of Criminal Court Cases with a Guilty Verdict by State and Year 
 
Note:  This figure shows annual counts of criminal court cases with at least one guilty verdict, 
for male defendants born between January 1945 and June 1952, heard during 1994-2010, for 
each of Australia’s three largest states. Data for cases heard prior to 2001 in QLD provincial 
courts are unavailable. 
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Figure 2  Ratio of Crimes Committed to Population by 6-month Birth Cohort and Conscription 
Ballot Outcome 
A. All crimes 
 
B. Violent crimes 
 
C. Non-violent crimes 
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D. Property crimes 
 
E. Drunk driving crimes 
 
F. Crimes resulting in imprisonment 
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G. Violent crimes resulting in imprisonment 
 
H. Non-violent crimes resulting in imprisonment 
 
I. Property crimes resulting in imprisonment 
 
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1945.1 1945.2 1946.1 1946.2 1947.1 1947.2 1948.1 1948.2 1949.1 1949.2 1950.1 1950.2 1951.1 1951.2 1952.1
Ballot In Ballot Out
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
1945.1 1945.2 1946.1 1946.2 1947.1 1947.2 1948.1 1948.2 1949.1 1949.2 1950.1 1950.2 1951.1 1951.2 1952.1
Ballot In Ballot Out
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
1945.1 1945.2 1946.1 1946.2 1947.1 1947.2 1948.1 1948.2 1949.1 1949.2 1950.1 1950.2 1951.1 1951.2 1952.1
Ballot In Ballot Out
34 
 
References 
ABS (2008), Australian Standard Offence Classification (ASOC), 2008 (2nd Edition) ABS Catalogue No. 
1234.0 (Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics). 
Agnew, Robert (1992), 'Foundation for a general strain theory of crime and delinquency', 
Criminology, 30 (1), 47-86. 
Almond, Douglas and Currie, Janet (2011a), 'Killing Me Softly: The Fetal Origins Hypothesis', 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25 (3), 153–72. 
--- (2011b), 'Human Capital Development before Age Five', in Orley Ashenfelter and David E. 
Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, (4b), 1315-486. 
Anderson, C and Bushman, B (2002), 'Human Aggression', Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27-51. 
Angrist, Joshua D. (1990), 'Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery: Evidence from 
Social Security Administrative Records', American Economic Review, 80 (3), 313-36. 
--- (1991), 'Grouped-data estimation and testing in simple labor-supply models', Journal of 
Econometrics, 47, 243-66. 
--- (1993), 'The Effect Of Veterans Benefits On Education And Earnings', Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, 46 (4), 637-52. 
--- (1998), 'Estimating the Labor Market Impact of Voluntary Military Service Using Social 
Security Data on Military Applicants', Econometrica, 66 (2), 249-88. 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Krueger, Alan B (1994), 'Why Do World War II Veterans Earn More 
than Nonveterans?', Journal of Labor Economics, 12 (1), 74-97. 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Pischke, Jorn-Steffen (2009), Mostly Harmless Econometrics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
Angrist, Joshua D. and Chen, Stacey H (2011), 'Schooling and the Vietnam-Era GI Bill: 
Evidence from the Draft Lottery', American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 3, 96-118. 
Angrist, Joshua D., Imbens, Guido W, and Rubin, Donald (1996), 'Identification of Causal 
Effects Using Instrumental Variables', Journal ofthe American Statistical Association, 91 (434 
(Jun., 1996)), 444-55. 
Angrist, Joshua D., Chen, Stacey H., and Song, Jae (2011), 'Long-term Consequences of 
Vietnam-Era Conscription: New Estimates Using Social Security Data', American Economic 
Review: Papers & Proceedings, 101 (3), 334-38. 
Arkin, W and Dobrofsky, L (1978), 'Military socialization and masculinity', Journal of Social Issues, 
34, 151-68. 
Autor, David H, Duggan, Mark G, and Lyle, David S (2011), 'Battle Scars? The Puzzling Decline 
in Employment and Rise in Disability Receipt among Vietnam Era Veterans', American 
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 101 (3), 339-44. 
35 
 
Bauer, Thomas K., et al. (2012), 'Evaluating the Labor Market Effects of Compulsory Military 
Service', European Economic Review, 56 (40), 814–29. 
Bound, John and Turner, Sarah (2002), 'Going to War and Going to College: Did World War II 
and the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for Returning Veterans?', Journal of 
Labor Economics, 20 (4), 784-815. 
Card, David and Cardoso, Ana Rute (2012), 'Can Compulsory Military Service Raise Civilian 
Wages? Evidence from the Peacetime Draft in Portugal', American Economic Journal: 
Applied Economics, 4 (4), 57-93. 
Conley, Dalton and Heerwig, Jennifer A (2012), 'The Long-Term Effects of Military 
Conscription on Mortality: Estimates from the Vietnam-era Draft Lottery', Demography, 
49 (3), 841-55. 
Currie, Janet and Tekin, Erdal (2012), 'Understanding the Cycle: Childhood Maltreatment and 
Future Crime', Journal of Human Resources, 45 (2), 509-49. 
Dobkin, Carlos and Shabani, Reza (2009), 'The Health Effects of Military Service: Evidence 
from the Vietnam Draft', Economic Inquiry, 47 (1), 69-80. 
Donnelly, R (2001), The Scheyville Experience. The Officer Training Unit, Scheyville 1965-73 (St Lucia: 
University of Queensland Press). 
Ebert, J (1993), A Year in a Life. The American Infantryman in Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press). 
Eisenhart, R (1975), 'You can't hack it little girl: a discussion of the covert psychological agenda 
of modern combat training', Journal of Social Issues, 31, 13-23. 
Elder, G (1988), 'The life course as developmental theory', Child Development, 69, 1-12. 
Elder, G and Clipp, E (1989), 'Combat experience and emotional health: impairment and 
resilience in later life', Journal of Personality, 57, 311-41. 
Fett, MJ, et al. (1984), The Mortality Report, 3 vols. (Australian Veterans Health Studies; Canberra: 
AGPS). 
Galiani, Sebastian , Rossi, Martín A., and Schargrodsky, Ernesto (2011), 'Conscription and 
Crime: Evidence from the Argentine Draft Lottery', American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, 3 (2), 119–36. 
Glenn, R (2000), Reading Athena's Dance Card. Men Against Fire in Vietnam (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press). 
Graziano, W, Jensen-Campbell, L, and Hair, E (1996), 'Perceiving interpersonal conflict and 
reacting to it: the case for agreeableness', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 820-
35. 
Graziano, W, et al. (2007), 'Agreeableness, empathy and helping: a person × situation 
perspective', Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 583-99. 
36 
 
Grenet, Julien, Hart, Robert A., and Roberts, J. Elizabeth (2011), 'Above and beyond the call. 
Long-term real earnings effects of British male military conscription in the post-war 
years', Labour Economics, 18, 194–204. 
Grossman, D (1995), On Killing. The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (Boston: 
Little, Brown). 
Ham, P (2007), Vietnam. The Australian War (Sydney: Harper Collins). 
Hearst, Norman, Newman, Thomas B, and Hulley, Stephen B (1986), 'Delayed Effects of the 
Military Draft on Mortality', The New England Journal of Medicine, 314 (10), 620-24. 
Hennessy, B (1997), The Sharp End. The Trauma of a War in Vietnam (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & 
Unwin). 
Houdepohl, A, Parrott, D, and Zeichner, A (2010), 'Heterosexual men's anger in response to 
male homosexuality: effects of erotic and non-erotic depictions of male-male intimacy 
and sexual prejudice', Journal of Homosexuality, 57, 1022-38. 
Imbens, Guido and van der Klaauw, Wilbert (1995), 'Evaluating the Cost of Conscription in the 
Netherlands', Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 13 (2), 207–15. 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (2012), The Military Balance (Routledge). 
Jackson, J, et al. (2012), 'Military training and personality trait development: does the military 
make the man, or does the man make the military', Psychological Science, 23, 270-77. 
Keane, Michael P. (2010), 'Structural vs. Atheoretic Approaches to Econometrics', Journal of 
Econometrics, 156, 3-20. 
Knudsen, Eric I., et al. (2006), 'Economic, neurobiological, and behavioral perspectives on 
building America’s future workforce', PNAS, 103 (27), 10155–62. 
Lindo, Jason M and Stoecker, Charles (2012), Drawn into Violence: Evidence on 'What Makes a 
Criminal' from the Vietnam Draft Lotteries (NBER Working Paper No. 17818). 
--- (forthcoming), 'Drawn into Violence: Evidence on 'What Makes a Criminal' from the 
Vietnam Draft Lotteries', Economic Inquiry. 
Longley, K (2008), Grunts. The American Combat Soldier in Vietnam (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe). 
Marshall, SLA (1978), Men Against Fire. The Problem of Battle Command in Future War (Gloucester, 
MA: Peter Smith). 
Martin, R, Watson, D, and Wan, C (2000), 'A three-factor model of trait anger: dimensions of 
affect, behaviour, and cognition', Journal of Personality, 65, 869-97. 
McNeill, I (1984), The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam (Canberra: Australian War 
Memorial). 
Miller, J and Lynam, D (2001), 'Structural models of personality and their relation to antisocial 
behavior: a meta-analytic review', Criminology, 39, 765-98. 
37 
 
Morris, M (1996), 'By force of arms: rape, war and military culture', Duke Law Journal, 45, 651-
781. 
Mount, M, Ilies, R, and Johnson, E (2006), 'Relationship of personality traits and 
counterproductive work behaviors: the mediating effects of job satisfaction', Personnel 
Psychology, 59, 591-622. 
Nicol, A, Charbonneau, D, and Boies, K (2007), 'Right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation in a Canadian military sample', Military Psychology, 57, 401-21. 
O'Brien, M (1995), Conscripts and Regulars with the Seventh Battalion in Vietnam (St Leonards, NSW: 
Allen & Unwin). 
Oi, Walter Y (1967), 'The Economic Cost of the Draft', American Economic Review, 57 (2), 39–62. 
Ozer, D and Benet-Martinez, V (2006), 'Personality and the prediction of consequential 
outcomes', Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 401-21. 
Paloyo, Alfredo (2010), Compulsory Military Service in Gemany Revisited (Bochum: Ruhr Economic 
Papers #206). 
Paloyo, Alfredo R., Vance, Colin , and Vorell, Matthias (2010), Local Determinants of Crime: Do 
Military Bases Matter? (Ruhr-Universität Bochum: Ruhr Economic Papers #211). 
Quigley, N (Signalman) (unpublished), 'Assorted Papers - 3rd Training Battalion', (Australian 
War Memorial). 
Rintoul, S (1987), Ashes of Vietnam. Australian Voices (Richmond, VIC: Heinemann). 
Roberts, B, Wood, D, and Caspi, A (2008), 'The development of personality traits in adulthood', 
in OP John, RW Robins, and LA Pervin (eds.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research 
(3rd edn.; New York, NY: Guildford Press), 375-98. 
Rohlfs, Chris (2010), 'Does Combat Exposure Make You a More Violent or Criminal Person? 
Evidence From the Vietnam Draft', The Journal of Human Resources, 45 (2), 271-300. 
Sampson, R and Laub, J (1996), 'Socioeconomic achievement in the life course of disadvantaged 
men: military service as a turning point, circa 1940-1965', American Sociological Review, 61, 
347-67. 
Siminski, Peter (forthcoming), 'Employment Effects of Army Service and Veterans’ 
Compensation: Evidence from the Australian Vietnam-Era Conscription Lotteries', 
Review of Economics and Statistics. 
Siminski, Peter and Ville, Simon (2011), 'Long-Run Mortality Effects of Vietnam-Era Army 
Service: Evidence from Australia’s Conscription Lotteries', American Economic Review: 
Papers & Proceedings, 101 (3), 345–49. 
--- (2012), 'I Was Only Nineteen, 45 Years Ago: What Can we Learn from Australia’s 
Conscription Lotteries?', Economic Record, 88 (282), 351-71. 
Simpson, N (Sgt) (unpublished), 'Unpublished Memoir', (Australian War Memorial). 
38 
 
Training Information Bulletin 13 (1966), Marksmanship in the Australian Army (Canberra: 
Directorate of Military Training.). 
Training Information Report (unpublished-a), 'Training Information Reports, 1969-70, HQ 
AFV', (Australian War Memorial). 
--- (unpublished-b), 'Training Information Reports, 1970-71, HQ AFV', (Australian War 
Memorial). 
Ville, Simon and Siminski, Peter (2011), 'A Fair and Equitable Method of Recruitment? 
Conscription by Ballot into the Australian Army during the Vietnam War', Australian 
Economic History Review, 51 (3), 277-96. 
Westheider, J (2007), The Vietnam War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press). 
Wilkowski, B, Robinson, M, and Meier, B (2006), 'Agreeableness and the prolonged spatial 
processing of antisocial and prosocial information', Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 
1152-68. 
Wilson, EJ, Horsley, KW, and van der Hoek, R (2005), Australian National Service Vietnam Veterans 
Mortality and Cancer Incidence Study 2005 (Canberra: Department of Veterans’ Affairs). 
 
 
